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THE PUBLIC TRUST IN PUBLIC WATERWAYS
BERTRAM C. FREY*
The public trust doctrine constitutes a practical tool for those who
seek to preserve the natural character and scenic beauty of waterways
throughout the nation.' These waterways, their contents, and lands
beneath or adjacent to them are subject to competing public and
private uses.2 In addition to supporting the few commercially harvest-
able fish that remain, this same real estate provides waterbased rec-
reation-boating, swimming and sport fishing. As a locus of economic
activity, these areas also harbor shipping and transportation indus-
tries and afford prime industrial development sites. A prodigious
managerial effort by state and federal governments along with deci-
sive citizen action is necessary to protect an already altered ecological
balance, curb pollution and circumvent the governmental maze of
* Third year student, Washington University School of Law; B.A., Haverford
College, 1969.
1. See J. SAx, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1971); Stone, Public
Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Waters, 1
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 177 (R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Stone]; V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
ch. 2 (1971); Cohen, The Constitution, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the
Environment, 3 UTAH L. REv. 388 (1970); Esposito, Air and Water Pollution:
What to Do While Waiting for Washington, 5 HAav. Civ. RiGHTS-CIv. Lmi. L.
REv. 32 (1970); Fraser, Title to the Soil Under Public Waters-A Question of
Fact, 2 MINN. L. REv. 313 (1918); Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public
and Private Rights in Navigable Waters, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 391 (1970);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. Rxv. 471 (1970); Waite, Public Rights to Use and
Have Access to Navigable Waters, 1958 Wis. L. REv. 335; Comment, Private
Fills in Navigable Waters: A Common Law Approach, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 225
(1972); Note, Public Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REv. 564 (1970); Note,
Governmental Restriction of Water Use, 1959 WIs. L. REv. 341; Comment,
Role of Local Government in Water Laws, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 117; Note,
Alienations of the Beds of Public Lakes-The Trust Doctrine, 5 WIs. L. REv. 34
(1928). Cf. Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law: Its
Application in the judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLA-
METTE L.J. 135 (1972).
2. See, e.g., Porro, The Coastal and Estuarine Zone: A National Interest, 19
N.J. ST. B.J. 6 (1970).
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concurrent jurisdictions.3 This Note traces the historical development
of the public trust doctrine and the problems it creates, and then sug-
gests ways that the doctrine may be applied today.
I. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PUBLIC TRUST IN WATERWAYS
The doctrine of public trust4 in waterwaysu has ancient roots.
Effective use of the doctrine requires an understanding of its Roman
origins, its evolution under English common law, and its early ap-
plication in American courts, The doctrine's history reveals that its
application is entirely dependent upon the socio-economic conditions
existing at the time in the jurisdiction in which the public trust is
enforced. Crucial to its continuing vitality is a recognition of the
various interests-governmental, commercial, recreational and aes-
3. The admiralty jurisdiction of the United States extends to every species of
tort committed on waters navigable in fact. United States v. Matson Navig. Co.,
201 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1953). State courts have jurisdiction over torts
committed within the state. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, §§ 95, 96 (1964).
See also MD. ANN. CODE art. 75, §§ 81, 82 (1964).
4. Generally, a public trust is defined as a right of property, real or personal,
held by one party for the benefit of the public at large or of some considerable
portion thereof. Goodwin v. McMinn, 193 Pa. 646, 44 A. 1094 (1899); Boyce
v. Mosely, 102 S.C. 361, 86 S.E. 771 (1915). See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). Public trusts and
charitable trusts may be considered synonomous expressions. Bauer v. Myers,
244 F. 902, 911 (8th Cir. 1917). These trusts differ from private trusts in that
their beneficiaries are uncertain and their duration is or may be perpetual. Id.
at 912. For purposes of this Note, the corpus of the public's trust comprises
certain natural resources and the scenic, historic and esthetic values of the en-
vironment entrusted to a sovereign or state for the benefit of its subjects or people.
5. A "waterway" or "watercourse" is generally understood to be a natural or
man-made channel through which water flows; it usually consists of flowing
water, a bed, banks and shore. Smith v. Cameron, 123 Ore. 501, 505-06, 262
P. 946, 948 (1928). See L. Houc, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NAVIOAMLE
RIvERS 1 (1868) [hereinafter cited as Houc].
There must be a stream, usually flowing in a particular direction, though it
need not flow continuously. It may sometimes be dry. It must flow in a
definite channel, having a bed or banks, and usually discharges itself into
some other stream or body of water. It must be something more than a
mere surface drainage over the entire face of the tract of land, occasioned
by unusual freshets or other extraordinary causes.
BLAcK's LAw DICTIoNARY 1763 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). See generally Leader v.
Matthews, 192 Ark. 1049, 1050, 95 S.W.2d 1138, 1139 (1936); City of Los
Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899).
6. For an excellent historical inquiry into this subject see Note, The Public
Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE
L.J. 762 (1970) [hereinafter cited as The Public Trust in Tidal Areas].
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thetic-that compete for dominion over the waters or possession of
the adjacent or underlying land.7
Deriving its legal heritage from the seafaring Greeks" and de-
veloping in a commercial society, Roman jurisprudence held that by
fundamental "natural law" navigable waterways were public prop-
erty.9 Private appropriation of waterways or of tidal or submerged
7. See Sax, supra note 1.
8. INsTuTus 1.2.2, 3, 10.
9. Roman law distinguished between navigable rivers and the sea, the former
being classed among res publicae, and the latter among res communes. Id. at
2.1.1, 2.1.2, DIGEST 1.7.5.; see 1 H. BRACTON, DE LEGMUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS
ANGLIAE ch. 12, §§ 3, 5, 6 (T. Twiss ed. 1878); J. GOULD, LAw oF WATERS
104 n.3 (1883). The Roman law distinction between things public and things
common, "acknowledged by both Bracton and Fleta, found those things public
which relate to the use of mankind only, and those things common which respect
all living animals indiscriminately." H. ScHULTES, AQUATIC RIGHTS 65, 66
(1839). Schultes further examines the distinction between things common and
things public:
Common is derived by some from Kolvow, which [according] to the
Grecian etymology, is communico cum aliquo. By others it is derived from
communis, as compounded of con, together, and munus, a gift of office;
but according to both Bracton and Fleta, the earliest of our writers,
common, in legal acceptation, is derived from communia, a word com-
pounded of una and cum, and we think implies according to its literal in-
terpretation, not only a right or service exercised together with others, but
such an intercourse as may be free enjoyed; and the strongest circumstance
to justify the presumption is, that common, e.g., common fishery, might
be a free tenement. . . . It appears to be an old term of designation,
signifying a freedom or partaking some benefit with others ....
Common may [also] be applied to a general class of rights.
Where common and public rights are alluded to in the books, we con-
sider them usually as having the same meaning, and implying freedom.
The civilians frequently blend them together, though they profess a dis-
tinction between public, common, and private things; this is apparent by
this passage amongst many others which might be adduced: "All rivers and
ports are public, and therefore the right of fishing in a port or river is in
common;" and, besides, in the old annotation on the Pandects of Justinian,
(in Bibliotheca Bodleiana,) the word public is expressly defined common
(publicum id est commune). Fleta, also, who transcribes copiously from the
Imperial law, says, some things are common, as the air, the sea, and sea-
shore, and others are public, as the right of fishing and using rivers and
ports, "aliae communes sunt, ut ser, mare, et littus marls, aliae publicae,
ut jus piscandi, et applicandi flumia et portus."
This public or common right relates to public streams, and is contradistin-
guishable from rights or services belonging to private property.
iT]he word publicum is derived from the word populus. Hence, if we
consider the natural advantage which accrues from a thing, we say that
such a thing is common; but if we consider the use of it among men as it
arises from industry, we call it a thing public if it extends to public use, and
therefore a thing may be said to be common by a promiscuous intercourse
and exercise of a public thing, the terms public and common, may become
convertible, as experience constantly shows.
Id. at 62-66.
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lands was impossible, 0 since title to these was held by the Roman
government, whose sovereignty extended over all tidelands and nav-
igable watercourses. But the right to occupy these areas belonged to
all Roman citizens universally,31 with unlimited freedom to fish, nav-
igate and take water.1 2
With the decline of the Roman Empire, commerce, navigation and
effective territorial administration declined throughout Europe. In
England, feudal lords came to occupy these once "commonly held"
waterways and tidelands. Ultimately, these areas came under the
dominion of the absolute sovereign. 13
At the time of the Magna Carta,14 "[R]iver navigation was threat-
ened by a large number of weirs (permanent fishing structures fixed
to the bottom) and other such devices-so much that Chapter 33 [of
the Great Charter] specifically prohibits them: 'all Kydells [weirs]
for the future shall be removed from Thames and Medway, and
throughout all England, except on the seashore.' " This section and
10. INSTITUTES 2.1.1-2.1.6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See S. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING
THERETO ch. 1 (1888); Note, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 759 (1971).
14. Prior to the Magna Carta, the King or his riparian grantees of river bed
soil either held title to the middle of a navigable stream, if they owned property
on only one bank of the stream, or held title to the entire stream and bed, if
they owned property on both sides of the stream. LORD HALE, C.J., DE JURE
MAUs ET BRACHIORUx EjusDEm chs. 1, 2, 4, reprinted in 1 HARoRAv., TRACTS
RELATIVE TO THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (1787) [hereinafter cited as HALE].
Theoretically, the King or his riparian grantees could have exacted a fee for
passage or right of fishing, dammed the river, or otherwise impeded navigation
and commerce.
15. The Public Trust in Tidal Areas 766. Chapter 33 of the Magna Carta is
contained in chapter 23 of the revised "Great Charter" of 1225. The last four
words excepting the seashore were added by Henry III in the revised version,
which is still on the English state books. See J. Holt, MAGNA CARTA 1 (1965);
Magna Carta ch. 33, reprinted in R. THOmSON, ESSAY ON THE MAGNA CARTA
112 (1829). Thompson elaborates:
The intent of this brief fragment of old Common Law, was to prevent any
person from appropriating to themselves a fishery of any part of the River
Thames which was common property; and thereby committing a Purpres-
ture, as it was anciently called, from the French, pourpris, an enclosure.
Every public river or stream, says Lord Coke, is the King's highway, which
cannot be privately occupied; and Glanvill adds, in his definition of Pur-
prestures, that to erect any obstruction over public waters across their
regular course, was to be considered as such. Such too, are Wears in gen-
eral, which are large dams made across rivers for the taking of fish or the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/10
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Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta as modified by subsequent acts of
ParliamentO prohibited the King, though owner of all public lands
and waterways, from granting away any of these areas to private
subjects. While the King could not alienate public lands and water-
ways, Parliament did, however, have the power to do so. Subse-
quently, even Parliament's right to alienate public lands and waters
was restricted 7 as the common law sought to broaden the public in-
terest.'5
Prior to the American Revolution, the Crown held all colonial
tidelands and beds of navigable waters in trust for the public use
and benefit.o After the Revolution, title to the submerged lands of
conveyance of water to a mill; and the peculiar kind mentioned in the text
[of the Magna Carta] called Kydells, were dams having a loop or narrow
cut in them, and furnished with wheels and engines for catching fish. They
are now called Kettles, or Kettle-nets, and are still in use on the seacoasts
of Kent and Cornwall. The removal of these instruments from Thames and
Medway is directed in several ancient Charters, beside the present; as in
1197 by King Richard I; in 1199 by John; in 1226-27 by Henry III; in
1333 by King Edward III; and by numerous acts of Parliament ....
Id. at 214.
For additional common law commentaries concerning purprestures compare 9
R. GLANVILL, DL LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINxBUS REGNI ANGLIAE ch. 11 (Beames
ed. 1900) with E. COKE, INSTITUTE OF THE LAWs OF ENGLAND* 277.b, 294.a.
In Attorney Gen. v. Evart Booming Co., 34 Mich. 462 (1876), Chief Justice
Cooley defined and commented upon a purpresture:
A purpresture may be defined as an enclosure by a private party of a part
of that which belongs to and ought to be open and free to the enjoyment
of the public at large .... [However,] a purpresture... is not necessarily a
public nuisance. . . . [A] purpresture may exist without putting the public
to any inconvenience whatever.
The appropriation by an individual of a part of a public common may there-
fore be a purpresture, and as it would constitute an invasion of a public
right, it would be proper that proceedings for its abatement should be taken
on behalf of the state. An unauthorized enclosure of a part of a highway
may also be a purpresture and a public wrong, whether the highway be one
by land or by water.
Id. at 472, 473.
Cf. Cobbs v. Commissioners of Lincoln Park, 202 Ill. 427, 67 N.E. 5. (1903). See
also HALE 85; J. GOULD, supra note 9, § 21.
16. Chapter 16 of the Magna Carta and succeeding statutes of Henry III
states: "None shall be distrained to do more for a Knight's-Fee, nor any other
free tenement, that what is due from thence." (emphasis added). R. THOmSON,
supra note 15, at 75. See also Id. at 51, 110, 122, 135, 149, 196, 197.
17. See generally J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS OF PROPERTY IN
TIDEWATERS 67, 69 (2d ed. 1847); HALE.
18. J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES 194 (2d ed.
1840).
19. Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226 (1899); Martin v. Waddell,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 416 (1842).
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navigable waterways passed to the original thirteen sovereignties.2
In interpreting colonial grants of seashores and riverbeds, the United
States Supreme Court and lower federal courts generally followed the
English common law, effectively transposing much of that law into
American law.21
II. THE MODERN TRUST DOCTRINE AND PUBLIC WATERWAYS
A. Pre-emptive Federal Authority
American courts did, however, make one significant change in the
common law; they expanded the concept of navigability beyond the
mere ebb and flow of the tides, 2 2 to include all waters that were
"navigable-in-fact." 23 At present, this "navigable-in-fact" test defines
20. Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226 (1899); cf. Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 15 (1894).
21. V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, supra note 1, at 23.
22. Houcx xiii, 8. See 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARmS 427; The Royal Fisheries
in the River Banne, Sir John Davies Reports 149 (K.B. 1611), cited in Houo
8. In the case of the River Banne, reprinted in 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1611),
it was resolved:
That there are two kinds of rivers, navigable and not navigable; that every
navigable river, so high as the sea ebbs and flows in it, is a royal river, and
belongs to the King, by virtue of his prerogative; but in every other river,
and in the fishery of such other river, the ter-tenants on each side have an
interest of common right; the reason for which is, that so high as the sea
ebbs and flows, it participates of the nature of the sea, and is said to be a
branch of the sea so far as it flows.
Houcic 8. Houck considers this holding dictum, and argues that although the
common law tidal test was a convenient test of navigability, it was not neces-
sarily the only one; and that wherever a public navigation existed, there the
rights of adjoining property owners of land were limited to the high water
mark, and the title to the soil of the river was in the Crown, in England, and
in this country, in the States. HoUcK 8, 9. Contra, J. ANGELL, LAW OF WATER-
COURSES § 535 (7th ed. 1877).
23. The American definition of navigable water derives from the famous
quotation in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870):
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are
navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or
are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the
customary modes of trade and travel on water. And they constitute navig-
able waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Con-
gress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they
form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other
waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried
on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which
such commerce is conducted by water.
Id. at 563.
For modem elaborations on this standard see Comment, Private Fills in
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not only the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts24 but also the
scope of the federal power to regulate navigation. 25
The federal government has several sources of power 26 that in-
herently limit the exercise of individual water rights and state trustee-
ship over navigable water or lands lying beneath, along, or adjacent
to navigable waterways. Pre-emptive federal authority over naviga-
tion, derived from the commerce clause,27 enables the United States
government to regulate the flow of navigable streams.28 This power
has been exercised by Congress in its enacting the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 189929 and in its allocating waters of the Colorado River by
legislation.-O
B. State Trusteeship of the Components of a Waterway
States, not the federal government, hold title to tidelands and lands
beneath navigable waters.3' In England, since the time of Lord
Hale,32 the Crown has held title to navigable tidelands and riverbeds
and dominion thereto has been vested in him as representative of the
nation and for the public benefit,33
In the New World, the Crown's trusteeship (jus publicum) over
Navigable Waters: A Common Law Approach, 60 CALIF. L. Rmv. 225, 230 n.32
(1972).
24. See note 3 supra.
25. See note 3 supra and note 26 infra.
26. No express reference to water resources exists in the United States Con-
stitution. Federal powers are derived from the commerce clause, property clause,
war and treaty powers, the general welfare clause, the interstate compact pro-
vision, and the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court in suits
between the states.
27. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443
(1851); Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also The Daniel
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
28. The federal navigable-in-fact test applies here. See note 23 supra.
29. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1899).
30. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Cf. Fish and Wildlife Coor-
dination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-668 (1938); Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407,
4 07a (1899); Water Quality Improvement Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1175 (1970);
National Environmental Policy Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335 (1970);
Water Quality Standards Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II 1972);
Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315, 1331-1343 (1953).
31. See cases cited note 20 supra.
32. Circa 1675.
33. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894).
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navigable waters passed to the grantees in the Royal Charters.a' Upon
independence, the trust interest was vested in the original states,
subject to the rights surrendered under the Constitution of the United
States.35 Since 18456 it has been clear that rights in tidelands and in
lands under navigable waters within state boundaries are governed
and controlled by state rather than by federal law. 7
At present, the generally recognized rule is that the states own
tidelands and lands beneath navigable waters subject to a public
trust (i.e., subject to the jus publicum), which upon alienation runs
with the land, in favor of the public as beneficiary. 3 A majority of
state courts have upheld the power of the state to convey an interest
to a private owner, so long as the interests of the public are safe-
guarded or enhanced by the grant.39 A few courts have denied the
power of the state to alienate these lands.40
The banks and shores of a watercourse are usually defined as that
property lying between high and low water mark.41 It is this property
which is known as tideland, and it is in this area that the state's
sovereign interest reigns.42 Status as marshland, meadowland, or
swampland, on the other hand, is of no legal significance. 43
Most courts rule that the state holds all lands below mean high
water mark in trust for the benefit and use of the public, 4 subject
34. See, e.g., Browne v. Kennedy, 9 Md. (5 Har. & 3.) 156, 163-64 (1821),
wherein the terms of the grant to the Lord Proprietor of Baltimore are quoted.
35. Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226 (1899); Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894).
36. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
37. Although the states acquired tidelands and lands beneath navigable waters
pursuant to federal law, they are not restricted in this area by federal law. See
Stone 196 n.81. But cf. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 43 (1894). The original
thirteen states may never have surrendered any rights to tidelands or navigable
riverbed soil.
38. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
39. See generally Stone.
40. Id. at 197 n.86.
41. Houc 119.
42. Porro, Invisible Boundary-Private and Sovereign Marshland Interests,
3 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 512, 516 (1970).
43. Id.
44. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 17, rehearing denied,
296 U.S. 664 (1935); Morris v. United States, 174 U.S. 196, 226 (1899);
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410, 416 (1842). Cf. Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 15 (1894).
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to easements granted to riparian owners.45 Pursuant to this trustee-
ship, the state regulates such uses and rights as navigation, free pas-
sage, commerce, fisheries, recreation, bathing, seaweed and shells, and
the "public interest,"46 where such are found below the mean high
water mark.
Four states47 recognize state title interest in navigable tidelands
only to the mean low water mark.4 8 Three other states49 draw the
line between sovereign and private interest at mean low water mark,
or 100 rods outward from mean high water mark, whichever is less.50
These seven minority states, however, extend their trusteeship into
the tideland area to protect beneficial public uses for navigation,
ports, free passage and fishing.51 To date, none of these minority
states has followed the lead of some majority states in recognizing
any additional public uses of tideland areas.52 The majority states
not only extend the physical boundaries of state trusteeship in tide-
lands but also recognize a greater number of public uses.
As a general rule, the ownership of navigable water is vested in
the public or in the state in trust for the benefit of the public.53 The
45. E.g., to construct bulkheads, wharves, piers. Nevertheless, the Army Corps
of Enginers, pursuant to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, and most states
strictly regulate dredge and fill operations in navigable waters. See Private Fills
in Navigable Waters, supra note 23.
46. See generally The Public Trust in Tidal Areas.
47. Connecticut, Delaware, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
48. Town of Orange v. Resnick, 94 Conn. 573, 109 A. 864 (1920) (express-
ing a special interest in a private littoral owner, though the balance of owner-
ship seems to be in the state); Harlan & Hollingsworth Co. v. Paschall, 5 Del.
Ch. 435 (1882); Citizens' Elec. Co. v. Susquehanna Boom Co., 270 Pa. 517,
113 A. 559 (1921); Black v. American Int'l Corp.,'264 Pa. 260, 107 A. 737
(1919); Palmer v. Farrell, 129 Pa. 162, 18 A. 761 (1889); Scott v. Doughty,
124 Va. 358, 97 S.E. 802 (1919) (by statute). See McDonald v. Whitehurst, 47
F. 757 (E.D. Va. 1891), aff'd, 52 F. 633 (4th Cir. 1892).
49. Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire.
50. Sinford v. Watts, 123 Me. 230, 122 A. 573 (1923); Snow v. Mt. Desert
Island Real Estate Co., 84 Me. 14, 24 A. 429 (1891); Clancey v. Houdlette,
39 Me. 451 (1855); Iris v. Town of Hingham, 303 Mass. 401, 22 N.E.2d 13
(1939), Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E.
124 (1909); Clement v. Bums, 43 N.H. 609 (1862); Nudd v. Hobbs, 17 N.H.
524 (1845) (dictum saying that New Hampshire would probably follow Mas-
sachusetts on this point).
51. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
52. See Stone 273, 274. But cf. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6601 et seq., 7001
et seq. (Supp. 1973).
53. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 38 (1894).
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waters of navigable streams are not ordinarily subject to private prop-
erty interests. Title to non-navigable waters, on the other hand, gen-
erally lies with the owner or owners of the land over which they flow
or in which they stand."4 In some western jurisdictions," the water
of natural streams is declared by constitution or by statute to be the
property of the public and subject to appropriation. 0 States have
the authority to establish for themselves rules regarding ownership
of watercourses and other bodies of water within their borders, sub-
ject to the constitutional restraint against interfering with vested
property interests5 7 or denying due process of law by taking private
property for public use without just compensation.58
Prior to the Magna Carta, there existed three kinds of fishing
rights in England.59 The King claimed the right of "several fisheries,"Go
an exclusive right to fish, which allowed him, at his pleasure, to take
a net down many English rivers through private or "free fisheries."
The second type of fishery, these "free fisheries," were granted by
royal franchise.- The third type of fishery, the right of common
piscary, was defined as a "liberty of fishing in another man's water."02
It survived as a remnant of the Roman common fishing right.
According to Lord Chief Justice Hale,63 the King stopped exercis-
ing his right of "several fisheries" before the 1600's, "for it created a
great trouble to the country, and little benefit or addition of pleasure
to the King."64 Free fisheries still exist, of course, in the United
54. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933); New
England Trout & Salmon Club v. Mather, 68 Vt. 338, 35 A. 323 (1896).
55. E.g., Arizona, Colorado and Wyoming.
56. See, e.g., AiZ. ]Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-101 (1956). See also Stockman
v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo.
110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
57. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158 (1918); United States v. Cress,
243 U.S. 316 (1917).
58. Cases cited note 57 supra.
59. See 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *34, 39, 40 [hereinafter cited as
BLACKSTONE]; R. HALL, ESSAY ON THE PIGHTS OF THE CROWN AND PRIVILEOES
OF THE SUBJECT IN THE SEA SHORE OF THE PEAL31 106 (2d ed. 1875); S.
MooRE, supra note 13.
60. See BLACKSTONE *39, 40; HALE. 7.
61. See J. ANGELL, supra note 22, ch. 3; BLACKSTONE *39, 40; S. MoORE &
H. MOORE, THE HISTORY AND THE LAw oF FxsHERIEs 81 (1903).
62. BLACKSTONE *34.
63. HAL. 5-8, 10-17.
64. Id. at 8.
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States and in England in the forms of various fishing licenses.65 The
right of common fishery survives in navigable waters and in many
states includes a limited right to take shellfish, oysters, clams, and
other aquatic animals and plants.6 The present English and American
rule is that the state or the Crown owns finfish, shellfish, seaweed,
or other aquatic or marine life before they are caught or harvested.67
Afterwards, if the catch otherwise conforms to state or royal regula-
tions, the fisherman acquires title.68
Before separating water from its general source,69 water rights, as
distinguished from ownership of the corpus of water, are usufructary
in nature.70 These rights include the right to the reasonable use of
the water, the right to use the flow of the stream, but cannot in any
way be understood to be private ownership of the corpus of water,
whether based on ownership of riparian land or on a right of ap-
propriation.,'
65. Many states also strictly regulate the taking of oysters, clams, shellfish and
various other aquatic or marine animals and plants. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE
art. 66c, §§ 237-314 (Supp. 1972).
66. See The Public Trust in Tidal Areas. Cf. Carson v. Hercules Powder Co.,
240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640 (1966), in which a duly licensed, local com-
mercial fisherman had standing to allege damages to his fishing rights in a non-
navigable stream.
67. State ex rel. Wear v. Springfield Gas & Elec. Co., 204 S.W. 942 (Mo.
App. 1918); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens,
160 Ore. 654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939).
68. See cases cited note 67 supra. Rules governing ownership of the contents
of navigable waterways have generally paralleled those determining ownership
of the corpus of the water and the tidal and river bed soil thereunder. The con-
tents of a waterway may include dissolved minerals, sand, salt, shells, wrecks,
flotsam, seaweed, and most importantly, aquatic animal life. Because the com-
mon law has been chiefly concerned with commercially valuable, aquatic animal
life, only common law fishing rights are discussed here.
69. See Clark & Martz, Classes of Water and Character of Water Rights and
Uses, 1 WATmRS AND WATER RIcGHTS 349 n.30 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
70. Id. at 349 n.31. See also Wiel, Running Waters, 22 HIav. L. Rav. 190
(1909). Wiel states three "first principles" of the law of running waters:
(1) Running water in a natural stream is not the subject of property, but
is a wandering, changing thing without an owner, like the very fish swim-
ming in it, or like wild animals, the air in the atmosphere, and the neg-
ative community in general. (2) With respect to this substance the law
recognizes a right to take and use it, and to have it flow to the taker so
that it may be taken and used,-a usufructary right. (3) When taken from
its natural stream, so much of the substance as is actually taken is captured,
and, passing under private possession and control, becomes private property
during the period of possession.
Id. at 213.
71. Hutchins, Selected Problems in Western Water Law 27 (U.S.D.A. Misc.
Pub. No. 418, 1942).
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Based on riparian principles, the American majority rule is that
each proprietor of land adjacent to a stream or river has the right
to the usufruct of the stream, and it is only for an unreasonable use
of this common benefit that an action will lie.7 2 It is a riparian's
fundamental right to have the body of water maintained in its
natural state, neither diminished in quantity nor impaired in qual-
ity.73 Correlatively, each riparian has a duty not to infringe upon
the riparian rights of others.
Water rights in a minority of states, chiefly western,74 are acquired
by priority of appropriation.75 In these states, water rights are not
dependent on the location, ownership, or use of particular land. 0
Contrary to riparian principles, the appropriative right is based on
actual use of water.77 The prior appropriator has no right to the
water except the actual use. In western states exclusively following
the doctrine of prior appropriation, a person having no right in the
flow acquired by prior appropriation has no cause for complaint if
the natural flow past his land is interfered with by an appropriator.78
It has been held, however, that appropriative water right filings, or
approved applications, are property rights and constitute a possessory
interest in real property pending perfection of the appropriator's
ability and right to take and use the water.79
72. See Clark & Martz, supra note 69, at 352. Although it has been frequently
said that the right to use the water is inseparably annexed to the soil, this is
correct only in the sense that it is normally part and parcel of the land belong-
ing to the riparian proprietor by virtue of his ownership of the land. Water rights
may be separated from the land and may be acquired as against the riparian
proprietor by grant or adverse use, or by condemnation. See, e.g., Stanford v.
Felt, 71 Cal. 249, 16 P. 900 (1886); Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674
(1886).
73. Harrell v. City of Conway, 224 Ark. 100, 271 S.W.2d 924 (1954). Before
the constitutional amendment of 1928 in California, the riparian owners had
the unrestricted right to the natural flow of water. Hand v. Carlson, 138 Cal.
App. 202, 31 P.2d 1084 (1934); Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water
Dist. v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 145 Me. 35, 71 A.2d 520 (1950); Jessup &
Moore Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 180 Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (1942). See Clark &
Mart:, supra note 69, at 352.
74. See Hutchins, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Coffin v. The Left-Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
77. Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074
(1933).
78. See Hutchins, supra note 71, at 311.
79. Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Bank of America, 212 Cal. App. 2d 719, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 401 (1963).
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Water rights may be adjudicated by courts in the same manner as
other property interests. A suit to quiet title to water rights is in the
nature of an action to quiet title to real estate.80
Protection of the quality and continuous flow of surface water-
ways within a state demands the broadest exercise of state trusteeship
powers over public waters. For this reason, the "navigability" test s 'L
as determining the "publicness" of a state waterway should be
abandoned. In its place the "suitability" test 82 is suggested. Adoption
of this test, which defines the publicness of a waterway in terms of its
suitability for use by a group of people having a common interest in
the waterway, 3 broadens the scope of state power. Furthermore, it
provides extensive state trusteeship and police powers over surface
waterways within state boundaries.
As indicated by an early Supreme Court case,84 rights in navigable
waters vary greatly from state to state, despite the fact that the federal
navigable-in-fact test has been adopted in some form in most states.s
In addition, navigability has meaning only when the purposes for
which the standard is used and the context in which it applies is
properly understood. For example, navigability may be used to de-
termine: federal admiralty jurisdiction;S6 title to beds of lakes and
streams for federal7 and state purposes; s the validity of various
80. Swift v. Goodrich, 70 Cal. 103, 11 P. 561 (1886); Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo.
502, 35 P. 475 (1894); cf. Gutheil Park Inv. Co. v. Town of Montclair, 32
Colo. 420, 76 P. 1050 (1904). A water right, because of its usufructary char-
acter, is an incorporeal hereditament, In re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah
2d 208, 271 P.2d 846 (1954), and should not be treated as an easement that
can be annexed to the land. Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942).
An early California case, however, calls an appropriate water right a corporeal
hereditament. Hill v. Newman, 5 Cal. 445, 63 Am. Dec. 140 (1855).
81. See note 23 supra.
82. See Stone 212-217.
83. An early case supporting this view is Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181,
53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
84. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894).
85. See note 23 supra. See also Leighty, supra note 1.
86. See note 3 supra.
87. See, e.g., United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931); United States v.
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1870).
88. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908);
Obrecht v. National Gypsum Co., 361 Mich. 339, 105 N.W.2d 143 (1960);
State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 451, 29 N.W.2d 657 (1947); Coxe
v. State, 144 N.Y. 396, 39 N.E. 400 (1895); Pacific Elevator Co. v. City of
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federal statutes and the legitimate scope of authority of Congress
with respect to water under its express and implied powers under
the Constitution;89 the extent of public9 and ripariano' rights to
surface use under state law when the beds are privately held; the
right of public or private riparian access to the water;"2 and specific
rights under state statutes.9 3 Furthermore, whether the body of water
is characterized as a lake or stream may be of consequential impor-
tance in many of the above instances.
The federal navigability test, determinative of the scope of federal
admiralty jurisdiction and navigation power, extends federal power
into a potentially broad area where it may pre-empt or restrict state-
created public and private water-related rights. One commentator 94
has placed present federal restrictions in the following perspective:
1) Federal controls over navigable waters have been exercised
only in areas of legitimate national concern.
2) The federal test for navigability is mandatory only in the
narrow situation in which ownership of the beds of navigable
waters is determinative.
3) State-owned beds may be disposed of under state law.
4) Rights to surface use both by the public and by private
riparians is determined, for the most part, by state law.
5) There is a strong likelihood that the Supreme Court, if di-
rectly confronted today with the issue of whether the federal
test of navigability or a conflicting state test of navigability is
controlling in the context of conflicts over surface uses of water,
would hold that the state test controls.95
Portland, 65 Ore. 349, 133 P. 72 (1913); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis.
423, 214 N.W. 820 (1927). See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894);
Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371 (1891); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876).
89. See, e.g., United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377(1940); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
90. See, e.g., Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Kerley
v. Wolfe, 349 Mich. 350, 84 N.W.2d 748 (1957); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo.
835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
91. See, e.g., Carson v. Hercules Powder Co., 240 Ark. 887, 402 S.W.2d 640
(1966). See also cases cited in note 90 supra.
92. See, e.g., Bolsa Land Co. v. Burdick, 151 Cal. 254, 90 P. 532 (1907);
Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 234 P.2d 446 (1951); McGlone v. Maynard,
303 Ky. 415, 197 S.W.2d 918 (1946). See also Waite, supra note 1.
93. See, e.g., LA. Clv. CODE ANN. art. 455 (1952).
94. Leighty, supra note 1.
95. Id. at 433.
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Thus, defining the limits of the state navigability test becomes crucial.
A review of all the cases dealing with the publicness of waterways
under a state test of navigability or otherwise is well beyond the scope
of this inquiry.96 Nonetheless, several tests for the publicness of state
waterways can be distinguished. There are numerous decisions which
restrict public uses exclusively to watercourses which are navigable
under the federal test or to those where the bed is publicly owned.97
Strong authority supports public use of water over private lands,
based either on a broader state theory of "navigability" than that
enunciated in the federal test,98 or simply on the theory that the
waterway in question is suitable for use by a group of people having
a common interest in it.19 Many court decisions favor the protection
of public use by requiring only that the water be capable of floating
a skiff, a canoe, or, most frequently a log.100 An early case0 1 suggested
many additional public uses of waterways: "sailing, rowing, fishing,
fowling, bathing, skating.... and other public purposes that cannot
now be enumerated or even anticipated.102
The suitability test for determining the publicness of state water-
ways permits judicial recognition of these additional public water
uses, all worthy of protection if reasonably exercised, while the cases
employing the traditional federal "navigability" test do not permit
such broad protection.
Navigability as defined for federal purposes is as outmoded today
for state purposes as was the restrictive English test of navigability
96. For a comprehensive discussion of public rights in navigable state waters
see Leighty, Public Rights in Navigable State Waters-Some Statutory Ap-
proaches, 6 LAND & W.ATER L. Rv. 459 (1971).
97. See, e.g., Parker v. Moore, 222 Ark. 811, 262 S.W.2d 891 (1953); Lake-
side Park Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa. 389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959); Monroe v. State,
III Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759 (1946); Boerner v. McCallister, 197 Va. 169, 89
S.E.2d 23 (1955).
98. See note 23 supra.
99. An early case supporting this view is Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181,
53 N.W. 1139 (1893).
100. Attorney Gen. ex rel. Commr. v. Taggart, 306 Mich. 432, 11 N.W.2d 193
(1943); People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc. 2d 373, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Police Ct.
1957); Roberts v. Taylor, 47 N.D. 146, 181 N.W. 622 (1921); Mentor Harbor
Yachting Club v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 170 Ohio St. 193, 163 N.E.2d 373
(1959); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 126 Tex. 129, 86 S.W.2d 441 (1935);
Muench v. Public Serv. Comnm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, aff'd on re-
hearing, 261 Wis. 515c, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952). See Stone 216 n.69.
101. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 185, 53 N.W. 1139, 1143 (1893).
102. rd.
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for federal purposes a century ago. 03 The public opportunity and
demand for surface water use is no longer limited to fishing and
commercial navigation as it was during the developmental period
of the federal navigability test for public waterways. With increased
leisure time, millions of Americans annually seek waterbased recrea-
tion. The internal combustion engine has not only made transporta-
tion to water available to the general public, but has also opened up
new waterbased means of recreation. Recreational interests, though
commercially valuable, define the public interest in waterways at
least as much as do those interests described in commercial nav-
igability terms.- 4 The suitability test allows easy judicial recognition
of the increasingly important public recreational interests in state
waterways.
III. STANDING TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT
"If th[e] [public trust] doctrine is to provide a satisfactory tool, it
must meet three criteria: It must contain some concept of a legal
right in the general public; it must be enforceable against the gov-
ernment; and it must be capable of an interpretation consistent with
contemporary concerns for environmental quality."'10 These three
criteria are seldom encountered in case law. The trend in some states
is nevertheless towards their recognition in the legislatures and in the
courts. Wisconsin and Massachusetts have made the most significant
contributions to the development of the public trust doctrine. 10
They have adopted statutory and constitutional bases to enforce the
public trust over public lands. Recently, through statutory enact-
ment, constitutional amendment, or court interpretation, Florida,107
103. See Stone 212-17.
104. See Waite, Pleasure Boating in a Federal Union, 10 BUFFALO L. PV.
427 (1961).
105. Sax, supra note 1, at 474.
106. Professor Sax thoroughly examines public trust law development in Cali-
fornia, Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Sax, supra note 1, at 474. See V. YANNA-
CONE & B. COHEN, supra note 1, ch. 2. In a recent and important case, Just v.
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972), the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin held that the state's public trusteeship over marshlands prohibited a
private landowner from dredging and filling maishy areas on his property. In
addition, the court refused to allow compensation to the landowner for restrict
ing the use of his land.
107. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 403, 412 (Supp. 1972).
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Michigan,1Os Pennsylvania,10 9 California,"'D New Jersey, "I and Mary-
land-l2 have made noteworthy contributions to public trust law.
A crucial standing case is Maryland Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Amerada Hess Corp.1 3 This case raised two critical issues:
first, whether the state had a property interest in its navigable
waters; and second, whether it could maintain a common law action
for damages to the condition of the water. Plaintiff sought damages
for an oil discharge into the waters of Baltimore Harbor." 4 Although
granting in part defendants' motions to dismiss and directing the
state to file an amended complaint, the court held that even though
Maryland had not enacted timely legislation prohibiting defendants'
acts of pollution, the state could nevertheless seek relief under the
public trust doctrine in a common law action for damages against
defendants."'5 Maryland has long recognized that "although the State
is said to be owner of the navigable waters within its boundaries, it
holds them, not absolutely, but as a quasi trustee for the public bene-
fit."13 Defendants contended that the "quasi trusteeship" of the state
was merely an expression of state police power to regulate, thus grant-
ing the state only an usufructary rather than an ownership interest.".1
The state claimed that its "trusteeship" presupposed a "technical
108. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1972).
109. PA. CoNsT. art. I, § 27 (1971).
110. Cf. CAL. CoNST. art. XV, § 2. See also Private Fills in Navigable Waters,
supra note 45; Note, California's Tideland Trust: Shoring It Up, 22 HAsTINGs
L.J. 759 (1971).
111. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super.
457, 292 A.2d 580 (L. Div. 1971), aft'd, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972).
112. Maryland Dept. of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
113. 350 F. Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972).
114. Id. at 1062.
115. Id. at 1067. The state brought suit for damages under a public nuisance
theory. After conferring standing to the state to sue for damages, the court held
that defendants' acts of pollution failed to constitute a public nuisance and
denied the state's claim for abatement costs.
116. Mayor of Baltimore v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 104 Md.
485, 493-94, 65 A. 353, 356 (1906).
117. Accord, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, rehearing denied, 335 U.S. 837
(1948); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Stevens v. State, 89 Md.
669, 43 A. 929 (1899). See also Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 355 U.S. 37 (1957).
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ownership"1ls that conferred a legal right to bring suit on behalf of
the public in order to serve "the common good!"19 of the citizens.
The court concluded: "[IMf the state is deemed the trustee of its
waters, then as trustee, the state must be empowered to bring suit to
protect the corpus of the trust-i.e., the waters-for the beneficiaries of
the trust-i.e., the public."1O2 This conclusion is buttressed by the
court's assertion that the state agencies charged with protecting the
public's interest have a right of recourse for damages to compensate
for the loss to the public. 2 1
Even without statutory authority, the attorney general of Mary-
land can now maintain a common law action under the public trust
doctrine for damages when injury occurs to the navigable waters of
the state. This result raises the question of who constitutes the
"public." In addition to the state attorney general who, if anyone,
has standing to sue to protect the corpus of the trust?
The holding in Amerada Hess expresses the general rule, extant
in England even before the enactment of the Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1601,12 that absent statutory authority to the contrary or a
special interest in a private party, only the attorney general has the
right to enforce a public or charitable trust.123 A person having a
118. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). Mr. Justice Frankfurter's language is most appropriate: "A State may
care for its own in utilizing the bounties of nature within her borders because it
has technical ownership of such bounties or, when ownership is in no one, be-
cause the State may for the common good exercise all the authority that technical
ownership confers." Id. at 408.
119. 350 F. Supp. at 1067.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The Statute of Charitable Uses, 43 Eliz. ch. 4 (1601), was not recognized
in Maryland until 1931. Prior to then, the common law was in force and the
courts of Maryland were without jurisdiction to enforce a charitable use under
the old statute. See MD. ANN. CoDE art. 16, § 195 (1966). This statute has
been held not retroactive. Fletcher v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 193 Md. 400,
67 A.2d 386 (1949). An obvious question is presented whether public trustee-
ship in the sense of "technical ownership" of the corpus of the navigable waters
of the state constitutes a charitable use for purpose of the Statute of Charitable
Uses.
123. See Mo. ANN. CoDE art. 16, § 195 (1966); A. ScoTr, THE LAW or
TRUSTS 2754 (1954). The suit may be brought by the attorney general on his
own initiative, or it may be brought by him on the relation of a third party. The
relator need not have a direct interest in the trust's enforcement. He is, how-
ever, liable for the costs which would otherwise have been assumed by the state,
and even if the relator brings the action, the attorney general and not the relator
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special interest in the enforcement of a public trust can, however,
maintain a suit for its enforcement. He must show that he is entitled
to receive a benefit under the trust which is not merely the benefit
to which members of the public at large are entitled.224 On the other
hand, a person having no special interest in the performance of a
public or charitable trust cannot maintain a proceeding, by manda-
mus or otherwise, to compel the attorney general to bring an action
to enforce the trust.125 According to the language of a Maryland
statute, "Courts of equity within this state shall have full jurisdiction
to enforce trusts for charitable purposes, upon suit by the Attorney
General or upon suit of any person having an interest in the enforce-
ment thereof. ' 2G
A. Federal Court Standing
Many cases which turn upon the question of the "navigability" of
a waterway fall within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 12 7 For this reason, federal standing requirements become im-
portant to determine whether certain "public" beneficiaries of the
public trust in navigable waterways have standing to sue.
In federal courts, "[w]hether a party has a sufficient stake in an
otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that
controversy is what has traditionally been referred to as the question
of standing to sue."' 28 In terms of the article III limitation of federal
court jurisdiction: 2 9
has charge of the conduct of the suit. Attorney Gen. v. Parker, 126 Mass. 216
(1879); Attorney Gen. v. Butler, 123 Mass. 304 (1877).
124. Schell v. Leander Clark College, 10 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1926); Harger
v. Barrett, 319 Mo. 633, 5 S.W.2d 1100 (1928); Larkin v. Wikoff, 75 N.J. Eq.
462, 72 A. 98 (Ch. 1909), aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 589, 78 A. 1134 (Ct. Err. & App.
1910). Cf. Wexler Constr. Co. v. Housing Authority, 149 Conn. 602, 183 A.2d
262 (1962); M.W. Watson, Inc. v. City of Topeka, 194 Kan. 585, 400 P.2d 689
(1965); Loughborough Dev. Corp. v. Rivermass Corp., 213 Md. 239, 131 A.2d
461 (1957); Nugent ex rel. Collins v. Vallone, 91 R.I. 145, 161 A.2d 802 (1960).
125. Ames v. Attorney Gen., 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955); Com-
monwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa. Commw. 231,
302 A.2d 886 (1973); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower,
Inc., 13 Adams Co. L.J. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1971) (a recent Pennsylvania case which
construes the public trust language in the "Environmental Amendment" to PA.
CONST. art. I, § 27 (1971)). See also A. ScoTT, supra note 123, at 2760.
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 195 (1966) (emphasis added).
127. See notes 3, 23 supra, and text accompanying note 86 supra.
128. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972). See Jaffe, Standing
Again, 84 HARv. L. REv. 633 (1971); Comment, Judicial Review of Agency
Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69 McH. L. Rnv. 540 (1971).
129. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authoriz-
ing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing
depends upon whether the party has alleged such a "personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy," . . . as to ensure that
"the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution."'30
The Supreme Court has stated two tests regarding the federal ad-
versary requirement: 1) "[W]hether the plaintiff alleges that the chal-
lenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise;"' 31
and 2) "[W]hether the interest sought to be protected is arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute
or constitutional guarantee in question."'132 Recently, in deciding
the sufficiency of allegations by persons who claimed injury of a non-
economic nature that was widely shared,133 the Supreme Court held
that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.134
B. State Court Standing
The strict common law standing requirement discussed above 35
has prohibited most "interested" members of the public from suing
to enforce a public trust. To circumvent these strict requirements,
three methods for conferring standing upon environmentalists or
other private parties in state courts have been suggested. These in-
130. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972), citing Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
131. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
132. Id. at 153. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970).
133. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972).
134. Id. at 735. "[A] mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how longstand-
ing the interests and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating
the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization 'adversely
affected' or 'aggrieved' . . . ." Id. at 739.
135. See notes 122-126 supra and accompanying text. Standing requirements
derived from public nuisance law are similar. To entitle a person to maintain
an action to restrain a public nuisance he must show that he has sustained or
will sustain some special damage other than and beyond the general inconven-
ience and injury sustained by the public. Donahue v. Stockton Gas & Elec. Co.,
6 Cal. App. 276, 92 P. 196 (1907); Costas v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 2d
409, 129 N.W.2d 217 (1964); see Medcalf v. Strawbridge, Ltd., 2 K.B. 102
1937); Fritz v. Hobson, XLII, L.T.R. (n.s.) 225 (Ch. 1880). Some states,
including Maryland, require that "a person seeking to redress a public wrong
... must prove special damages from such a wrong, differing in character and
kind from that suffered by the general public" (emphasis added). Loughborough
Dev. Corp. v. Rivermass Corp., 213 Md. 239, 242, 131 A.2d 461, 463 (1957).
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dude 1) by statute, 2) by state constitutional amendment, and 3)
by judicial interpretation. Thus far, the statutory method, as de-
veloped in Michigan, I'6 appears most effective.
Section 2 of Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970'37
expressly confers citizen standing to sue. Thus, in Michigan, one
does not have to allege a special interest in the enforcement of a
public trust or special damages in order to redress certain environ-
mental injuries.' 38 This statute, which has not been held unconstitu-
tional1 39 should allow for effective redress of environmental injuries.
A state constitutional amendment provides another vehicle for the
creation of citizen standing to sue absent a special interest or special
damages. Pennsylvania's recent "Environmental Amendment"' 40 pro-
vides:
136. McH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1972). See also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 403.412 (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (Supp. 1972).
137. McH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1972):
Action in the circuit court; granting of relief.
Sec. 2 (1) The attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, any
instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof,
any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal
entity may maintain an action in the circuit court having jurisdiction where
the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for declaratory and equit-
able relief against the state, any political subdivision thereof, any instru-
mentality or agency of the state or of a political subdivision thereof, any
person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal
entity for the protection of the air, water and other natural resources and
the public trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction.
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is involved
a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixed
by rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a
political subdivision thereof, the court may:(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the stand-
ard.(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption
of a standard approved and specified by the court.
138. See Sax, Michigan's Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress
Report, 70 Micir. L. Rav. 1003, 1019 (1972). See generally Bartke, Dredging,
Filling and Flood Plain Regulation in Michigan, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 861, 874
(1971); Heyman & Twiss, Environmental Management of Public Lands, 58
CALIF. L. Rav. 1364, 1410 (1970); Johnson, An Optimal State Water Law:
Fixed Water Rights and Flexible Market Prices, 57 VA. L. REV. 345 (1971);
Leighty, Aesthetics as a Legal Basis for Environmental Control, 17 WAYNE L.
RFv. 1347, 1357 (1971); Rodgers, Industrial Water Pollution and the Refuse
Act: A Second Chance for Water Quality, 119 U. PA. L. Rev. 761, 786 (1971).
139. See Roberts v. Michigan, - Mich. App. -, 206 N.W.2d 466 (1973).
Sax, supra note 138, at 1019, 1064. See also note 169 infra.
140. PA. CONST. art. I. § 27 (Supp. 1971).
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The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values
of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are
the common property of all the people, including generations to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all people. 41
As interpreted,1 2 however, the constitutionally created trust in the
state's public natural resources can only be enforced by the attorney
general of Pennsylvania. 143
Possible recognition of citizen standing to sue, without an allega-
tion of a special interest in the enforcement of a public trust, is sug-
gested by a line of New Jersey decisions. New Jersey courts have
traditionally taken a broader approach to the standing question than
have the federal courts.1' Plaintiffs have standing if they allege that
their concern with the subject matter evidences real adverseness and
a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy, giving due weight
to the interests of individual justice along with the public interest.14
Crucial to this standing test is what constitutes a "concern" for the
environment. For instance, do renowned conservation and environ-
mental non-profit organizations have standing in their own right in
New Jersey courts to raise questions of enforcement of the state's
public trust over public property?14 Because New Jersey courts have
141. Id.
142. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 8 Pa.
Commw. 231, 302 A.2d 886 (1973); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg
Battlefield Tower, Inc., 13 Adams Co. L.J. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1971). A drafter of
Pennsylvania's "Environmental Amendment," however, has suggested that ben-
eficiaries of the public trust have standing to sue for injury to the public natural
resources of the Commonwealth. See Broughton, The Proposed Pennsylvania
Declaration of Environmental Rights, Analysis of HB 958, 41 PA. B. Ass'N Q.
421 (1970).
143. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 13 Adams Co.
L.J. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1971).
144. Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 101,
275 A.2d 433, 434 (1971).
145. Id. at 107, 275 A.2d at 437.
146. In New Jersey there are two kinds of public property, "one reserved for
the necessities of the state, and used for the public benefit." Arnold v. Mundy,
6 NJ.L. 1, 71 (Sup. Ct. 1821), the other "common to all the citizens, who take
of them and use them, each according to his necessities, and according to the
laws which govern their use, and are called common property." Id. This common
property consists of navigable rivers, ports, bays, sea coasts, including land under
the water which could be utilized for "navigation, fishing, fowling sustenance,
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traditionally fashioned standing criteria broader than those of federal
courts,1 47 they might be inclined to find that these environmental
groups have standing to sue in their own right. A ruling of this kind
would nonetheless fly in the face of common law public trust re-
quirements and possibly of proper judicial construction of "real
adverseness" and "sufficient stake."
Evidence of real adverseness and a sufficient stake in the outcome
of a civil proceeding limits and defines what sort of "concern" in a
subject matter a party can assert in order to have standing. Thus, an
environmental group asserting a concern in the enforcement of a
public trust must show the sufficiency of the group's stake in the out-
come of the judicial proceeding and the reality or concreteness of its
adverse interest as against that of the other party or parties to the
proceeding. Two common situations in which standing problems
might arise are an environmental group's suit against a private de-
veloper to enjoin his proposed development and an environmental
group's suit against a state agency to enjoin its alleged unconstitu-
tional, illegal, or unauthorized actions (e.g., sale of public lands
held under a public trust, 148 issuance of permits to pollute,14" or
failure to enforce a public trust 150).
In the first instance, the environmental group's interests are ad-
verse to those of the developer in that their respective purposes are
contrary: the environmentalists seek to preserve the natural character
and perhaps the scenic beauty of the site, while the developer de-
sires a profit from his proposed construction. The environmental
group's financial stake in the outcome, however, is far smaller than
that of the developer. It would be difficult for the group to show an
and other uses of the water and its products . . . ." Id. at 77. Since by its
nature this common property did not permit title to vest in the people, the
common law "placed it in the hands of the sovereign power to be held, pro-
tected, and regulated for the common use and benefit." Id. See New Jersey
Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119 N.J. Super. 457, 520-533, 292
A.2d 580, 615-623 (L. Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545 (1972).
147. Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 101,
275 A.2d 433, 434 (1971).
148. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Interlake Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 917 (N.D.
II. 1969).
150. See, e.g., New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 119
N.J. Super. 457, 292 A.2d 580 (L. Div. 1971), aff'd, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545
(1972).
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injury to an economic interest which differs from that suffered by the
public at large unless it joins as a party plaintiff, a member-owner
of adjacent land the value of which will be affected by the project.
Thus, if the sufficiency of the group's stake in the outcome is defined
solely with reference to economic injury, absent joinder of a co-
plaintiff the group would fail to show a sufficient stake necessary for
the court to confer standing to sue.
In recent decisions,151 the Supreme Courts of both the United
States and New Jersey have asserted that injury to a party's interests
need not merely be economic for him to maintain a suit.152 When
injury to non-economic interests is asserted, as it would be in the
above hypothetical situation, the question presented is whether trees,
fish, and natural areas have standing to sue.1Y3 Mindful of the Supreme
Court's recent decision which, in effect, denied standing to inanimate
objects,154 the New Jersey court, nevertheless, has the power to grant
standing to non-profit groups to sue in their own right on behalf of
inanimate objects, solely because they allege a longstanding interest
in environmental matters. But without statutory authority or a con-
stitutional amendment granting standing to environmental or public
interests, 55 it is likely that the Supreme Court of New Jersey will
follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court.
In the second situation involving standing problems, where an
environmental group seeks to enjoin a state agency from despoiling
public lands, the problem of sufficiency of stake in the outcome of the
suit arises in much the same form as it does when the environment-
alists sue a private party. Solution to the problem depends upon
whether the group can show an injury to its interests, economic or
otherwise, which differs from that sustained by the public at large.
Here, the adverseness issue arises in a slightly different way. The
151. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Crescent Park Tenants
Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971).
152. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972); Crescent Park Tenants
Ass'n v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 101, 275 A.2d 433, 434 (1971).
153. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
154. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
155. For example, to enforce a public trust in wild animals and in certain
public lands and waterways. See LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263
U.S. 545, (1924); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). In Geer the
Supreme Court definitively traced the evolution of the public ownership-sov-
ereign ownership in wild animals.
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positions of both parties, advocating the public's rights, are ultimately
identical. They may differ markedly, however, in the means believed
necessary to protect those rights. Both the state and the environ-
mentalists will allege that they are the genuine advocate and true
representative of the public interest. Each party will claim that it is
promoting the public health and welfare, protecting the quality of
the environment, and managing trust property for the common use
and benefit of the public. If an "ultimate public interest" test is
applied to determine real adverseness, then it is questionable whether
sufficiently concrete antagonism can be found between the parties.
Alternatively, if the means by which the public trust is managed or
enforced is dispositive of the matter, then true adverseness clearly
exists. In many situations, environmentalists could easily allege that
the means employed by the state agency in managing the corpus of
the trust actually defeats the purpose of the trust.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PUBLIC TRuST DOCTRINE
Perhaps the rules derived from State v. Public Service Commis-
sion1 56 come close to implementing the public trust doctrine in pub-
lic waterways. In that case, the City of Madison wanted to fill certain
portions of a park lagoon and lake-bed to use it for parking cars and
other "public" uses. 1T The Wisconsin supreme court concluded that
the proposed changes were not objectionable because they increased
the public usage of the area. 151 Applying the factors enumerated
below, the court acknowledged that the trust doctrine prevented a
grant for a purely private purpose; and "even for a public purpose,
the state could not change an entire lake into dry land nor alter it so
as to destroy its character as a lake."'-' Nonetheless, "the trust doc-
trine [did] not prevent minor alterations of the natural boundaries
between water and land."160
The factors considered by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin were
as follows. 1) Public bodies will control the use of the area. 2) The
area will be devoted to public purposes and open to the public. 3)
The diminution, pollution, or destruction of the area will be very
156. 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).
157. Id. at 113-15, 81 N.W.2d at 71, 72.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 74.
160. Id.
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small when compared with the effect of the change or proposed change
upon the surrounding area. 4) No one of the public uses of the area
will be destroyed or greatly impaired. 5) The disappointment of
those members of the public who may desire to boat, fish, swim, or
otherwise lawfully use the area to be altered is negligible when com-
pared with the greater convenience to be afforded those members of
the public who will use the area. 18'
These standards could be applied to the oil spill in the Baltimore
Harbor in Amerada Hess as follows. 1) The Maryland Department of
Natural Resources and the Maryland Port Authority control the use
of the Baltimore Harbor. 2) The Harbor is devoted to a public pur-
pose and open to the public. 3) The damage caused by the single
spill was temporary, but it still affected a large area of the Harbor.
4) The public uses of navigating and fishing were not permanently
destroyed or greatly impaired, though they may well have been im-
paired in parts of the harbor for several weeks. 5) The oil spill was
inconvenient to everyone, even to the spillers, who lost valuable oil.
Falling to meet this last test and perhaps also the third test, the public
trust in a public waterway has been violated by defendant oil spillers,
and they should be assessed at least the cost of abating the pollution.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Public rights in surface waterways have long been established in
the common law. In the United States these rights have been accepted
and expanded. The public trust doctrine and citizen standing re-
quirements which do not necessitate a showing of a special interest
in the enforcement of a public trust provide a solid legal foundation
for the protection of these public rights.
States have had primary responsibility for protecting public rights
in surface waterways. State protection of these rights, where it has
not been pre-empted by federal regulation, has been primarily based
upon the police power, and has usually been based in statute. Public
trust theory provides an alternative and more comprehensive legal
basis for state ownership and effective management of public water-
ways.
"Navigability," though still the test under federal and most states'
laws, is outmoded as the sole criterion for the publicness of a surface
waterway. In its place the "suitability" test, which considers the many
161. Id. at 118, 81 N.W.2d at 73.
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and varied uses, especially recreational uses, of waterways by the pub-
lic should be adopted.
If the public trust in the waterways of a state is to be effective, it
must include the right of a state citizen, as beneficiary of the public
trust, to sue to protect the corpus of that trust. This right must be
enforceable against state agencies, whose duties include enforcement
of the public's interest.
Traditionally, absent a showing of a special interest in the enforce-
ment of a public trust, only the state attorney general has been able
to enforce public or charitable trusts. Most attempts, at both state
and federal levels, to change this common law standing requirement
have failed. Of the three methods urged thus far, namely, consti-
tutional amendment, statutory enactment, and judicial interpreta-
tion, only statutory abrogation of the common law rule appears to
have been successful, and this only in Michigan.162 Even there, the
constitutionality of the citizen's standing provision, allowing suits
against state agencies to enjoin the "pollution, impairment, or de-
struction of the environment" under public trust theory, has not as
yet been upheld by the highest court.163
Public trust theory not only provides the legal foundation for pro-
tection of public rights in state surface waterways but also can become
the legal cornerstone for preservation of the entire environment.164
Public trust theory has already been applied in the cases of air pollu-
tion,165 wild game,1G6 public lands,' 67 parks,168 and highways and
roads. 169 Public trust doctrine can provide a theoretical legal basis
162. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1) (Supp. 1972).
163. See Roberts v. Michigan, - Mich. App. -, 206 N.W.2d 466 (1973),
which reversed on other grounds the lower court's finding that the citizen's
standing provision of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 was
unconstitutional. Roberts v. Michigan, 2 E.R.C. 1612 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971).
See also Comment, Judicial Alteration of Administrative Water Pollution Stand-
ards, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 362 (1974).
164. See J. S&%, supra note 1.
165. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (Supp. 1971).
166. LaCoste v. Department of Conservation, 263 U.S. 545 (1924); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
167. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911); United States v. Trinidad
Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890); Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S.
151 (1886).
168. City of Davenport v. Buffington, 97 F. 234 (8th Cir. 1899).
169. Jefferson County v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 146 F.2d 564 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 871, rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945).
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for curtailing private use of any property in which the public has a
substantial interest17o There is no reason why comprehensive en-
vironmental zoning could not be accomplished and justified under
public trust theory instead of under the conventional zoning doc-
trine.17 And there is every reason for those who seek to preserve the
natural character of our air, water, and land to employ the public
trust doctrine in defending the environment.
170. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761
(1972). See also note 106 supra.
171. Zoning is traditionally upheld if it bears a rational relation to a proper
purpose of state police power. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926).
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